It is becoming increasingly accepted among analysts of British voting behaviour that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, local campaigning matters. The widespread view, largely propagated by David Butler and his co-workers on the Nuffield election studies, has been that campaigning in the constituencies by party activists and their candidates has no influence on the outcome: the distribution of votes across the parties in each constituency is a function of the national campaign only.
spent is limited by law, 4 and although many party organizations probably manage their expenditure so that more is spent than reported, nevertheless the pattern of reported spending is consistent with expectations derived from rational choice theory. According to this, parties should spend more (a) defending the seats that they already hold, especially those which they hold by relatively small majorities, and (b) challenging in seats where they have a chance of winning. Those hypotheses are sustained by analyses of spending patterns over more than fifty years. 5 Given that parties raise and spend more money where it is most likely to have an impact, 6 the subsequent expectation is that the more that a party spends on mobilizing voters in a constituency, the more votes it should win there. This hypothesis has also been upheld in all analyses: in particular, the more that challengers spend, the better their performance, ceteris paribus. 7 Most reported constituency campaign spending (more than 80 per cent) is on advertising of various forms, specifically on printing leaflets and posters designed to bring the party and its candidate to the voters' attention. (We use the term 'advertising' to refer to all expenditure.) This may stimulate a direct link between spending on advertising and voting: the greater a candidate's exposure to the electorate the greater the number of votes garnered. 8 Alternatively, advertising per se may not be particularly efficacious, but the amount spent on it in a constituency provides a good indicator of the amount of canvassing and related activity undertaken by a party there. The more that it raises locally (most constituency parties in Britain get little, if any, financial assistance from their central organization), then the better organized the local party is likely to be, and the greater the number of activists it can mobilize to undertake canvasses of voters and other activities designed to enhance turnout in support of their candidate.
The later work on local campaigns supports the latter argument. In their study of local Labour parties at the 1987 general election, for example, Seyd and Whiteley developed an index of local activism in 479 constituencies based on three measures of party member activity -displaying posters, delivering leaflets and canvassing voters. 9 These data were used to explore the relationships between activism and spending: analyses showed that constituencies with high levels of activism, and where, in addition, relatively large percentages of voters reported having been canvassed by Labour, tended also to be those where relatively high levels of spending were reported. 10 A study of local campaigns at the 1992 general election produced similar findings. Based on a survey of agents -the candidates' campaign managers -in all three main parties, Denver and Hands devised an index of campaign activity covering seven topics: pre-campaign organization; number of workers involved in campaigning; proportion of the constituency canvassed; volume of literature distributed; use of computers; and 'knocking-up' and other activities on polling day designed to ensure that all identified supporters attended the polling booth. Their index (derived from a principal components analysis of those data) was correlated with both party membership figures and the amounts spent by the parties on those campaigns, finding that the stronger the local campaign the greater the amount spent.
11 As a consequence of this finding, Denver and Hands used campaign spending among other indicators to 'fill the holes' in their dataset where no data had been obtained from agents, as a readily-available surrogate measure of campaign activity;
12 Whiteley and Seyd used it in a similar way in their later studies of Conservative party local campaigns.
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The implication drawn from these studies is that data on campaign spending, on which full information is collected and published after each election, 14 form a valid, readily-available and universal surrogate measure of constituency campaign activity at British general elections. What remains untested, however, is whether spending itself has any independent impact on the result or whether it is no more than a good surrogate measure of canvassing activity. Do parties which spend more than expected on advertising (given their other campaigning activity) reap an additional benefit from that: does advertising pay? THE APPROACH To answer this question we use the reported spending data and the campaign activism variables produced by Seyd and Whiteley and Denver and Hands respectively. As a first step, we regressed the amount spent by a party in a constituency (expressed as a percentage of the maximum allowed there) 15 against the relevant activism variable. From this we computed the residual level of spending (the amount actually spent less the amount predicted): a positive residual indicates more spending than expected given the amount of campaign activity reported by the party for that constituency, whereas a negative residual indicates less spending than expected. At the second step we regressed the election outcome in those constituencies (using a dependent variable described below) against both the activism variable and the spending residual. If the former is significantly related to the outcome, this indicates that the general process of campaigning has an impact on the outcome in a constituency (with spending, to the extent that it is correlated with activism measures, providing a useful surrogate for that activity). If the spending residual is also significantly related to the outcome, then spending has an independent impact -in addition to the impact of the general volume of campaign activity, advertising pays.
Our dependent variables in these analyses are the ratios between the percentages of the votes cast at the election won by two of the parties. As we have argued elsewhere, 17 the main goal of constituency campaigns at British general elections is not converting voters to a particular party's cause (though any conversions are, of course, welcome!), but rather on identifying a party's likely supporters and then ensuring, as far as is practicable, that they cast a vote. 18 The goal is to maximize turnout of one's own supporters, and so alter the ratio between the party's vote and that of a competitor. By using the same ratio at the previous general election as an independent variable in the model, the analyses focus on the amount of change generated by campaign activity (the activism variable) and spending (the residual value), holding constant the average system-wide swing between the two parties.
We have analysed the constituencies held by the different parties separately, in line with our arguments developed elsewhere. 19 Incumbent parties tend to spend close to the maximum in all constituencies, with little variation; challenger parties vary much more in the amounts spent, which should be more clearly reflected in the electoral outcome. Tables 1 and 2 give results from the analyses of Labour spending at the 1987 general election, in those constituencies for which Seyd and Whiteley had data on campaign activity by the Labour party. (Because they studied the Labour party only, we could not disaggregate the spending components for other parties and so concentrate here only on Labour campaign activity and spending.) Five of the six coefficients are statistically significant in Conservative-held seats (Table 1) indicating that both campaign activity in general and additional spending on advertising in particular influenced the outcome. Thus the more active the Labour challenge in a constituency (the variable LCA), the smaller the ratio of Conservative to Labour votes in 1987, holding constant the ratio in 1983; furthermore, if the challenger spent more than predicted (LSR), this further reduced the ratio. Where Labour campaigned strongly against a Conservative incumbent, and spent above average for such a constituency on advertising, it reaped an electoral benefit. Labour advertising, though not its general canvassing activity, also influenced the ratio of Labour to Alliance votes (theL:Aratio): the more Labour spent on advertising (LSR), the better its performance over the Alliance, relative to the outcome in 1983. Finally, the greater the amount of Labour activism and the more it spent on advertising, the better the Conservative performance relative to that of the Alliance (i.e. theC:A ratio). The implication is that the more that Labour campaigned in a Tory-held seat, the greater the shift from the Alliance to the Conservatives, presumably because potential 'third-party voters' preferred to return a Conservative MP than split the anti-Labour vote with the possibility of the Tories losing the seat to Labour.
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The results for Labour-held seats are less impressive, which is entirely consistent with our other work on the impact of spending: challengers benefit much more than incumbents (Table 2) . Nevertheless, the more active the Labour defence of its seats the smaller the Conservative : Labour ratio in 1987 relative to 1983. Whereas the Seyd-Whiteley data only allowed us to estimate Labour spending in 1987, the Denver-Hands data refer to all parties. The number of constituencies for which they had data on campaign activity for all three parties was relatively small, however, and no analyses were possible for Liberal Democrat-held (i.e. Alliance in 1987) constituencies; the relatively small Ns may account for the poorer performance of these models compared to those reported above, especially in Labour-held seats.
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There is no evidence that the strength of the Labour campaign had any influence on the outcome of its contests with the incumbent party in Conservative-held seats (Table 3) . Interestingly, however, in those constituencies where the Conservatives spent more than predicted, presumably on a strong advertising campaign, this produced an increase in the Conservative : Labour ratio, relative to the general change since 1987; extra advertising brought rewards for the incumbents.
23 Liberal Democrat activism also 22 Denver and Hands used campaign spending as a surrogate measure of campaign activity for parties in constituencies for which they obtained no data from the candidates' agents. These constituencies have been excluded from the present analyses, as to include them would involve a degree of circular reasoning -spending would be predicted by a measure derived from spending! 23 This is consistent with the findings in Johnston and Pattie, 'The Value of Making an Extra Effort'. With regard to the Conservative : Liberal Democrat (C : LD) ratio in Conservativeheld seats, the challenger's campaign was clearly efficacious; both the amount of Liberal Democrat activism and the amount which the party spent over-and-above the predicted level are significantly, and negatively, related to the ratio. The more that the Liberal Democrats campaigned and the more they spent on advertising, relative to the size of that campaign, the better their performance proportionate to the Conservatives and compared to their performance at the previous general election. Furthermore, Conservative activity and expenditure in response apparently could not counter this impact; the challengers were able to promote their cause but the incumbents could not respond. Liberal Democrat canvassing and expenditure also benefited the party in its contests with Labour candidates in Conservative-held seats (the L : LD ratio). In addition, however, Labour campaign activity was able to offset this, to the same extent (the two regression coefficients have the same value of 0.026).
Turning to Labour-held seats, the first equation reported in Table 4 shows that the greater the Conservative challenger's campaigning activity and relative advertising expenditure, the better its performance in contests with Labour incumbents, although in this case it was significantly countered by incumbent activism (given the relative size of the coefficients, Ϫ 0.053 and Ϫ 0.055 respectively, additional Labour spending more than compensated for a similar volume of additional Conservative spending). 25 Similarly in the other two equations, the more active the Liberal Democrats were in the local campaign the more votes they were able to gain relative to each of the other parties, with neither apparently able to respond.
In general, these findings provide less support for the overall hypotheses being tested regarding campaign activity in general and expenditure on advertising in particular than do those in the previous section. This may reflect on differences in the dates of the elections studied, in the relative efficacy of the two indices of activism, 26 and the number of constituencies in the analyses. Further research is clearly needed to extend the growing body of evidence that local campaign activity, of a variety of types, has a crucial impact on election outcomes. SUMMARY Constituency campaigning matters. An increasing volume of studies shows that the more activists a party has on the streets and doorsteps at a general election in the United Kingdom, the better its electoral performance, ceteris paribus, and also that the more a party spends on advertising, the better its performance. In this brief note we have extended that conclusion by separating out two components of the search for votes in constituencies: general campaigning and advertising. We have shown that, in general and in line with other research, incumbent-party campaigning is less effective than that by challenger parties. We have also shown that in some cases, money spent on advertising in addition to that predicted from a party's general level of activism in a constituency has been effective. Advertising a party's candidate pays.
